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EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS:
SEX IS NOT A SUSPECT CLASSIFICATION
Kahn v. Shevin, 94 S. Ct. 1734 (1974)
Appellant Kahn, a widower, applied for a 500 dollar property tax exemption pursuant to Florida Statutes, section 196.191(7),' which accords a property
tax exemption to widows, blind persons, and the totally and permanently disabled.2 After his application for the exemption was denied, Kahn filed a complaint for declaratory relief against the Dade county tax assessor.3 He argued
that the Florida statute conferred a benefit based solely on sexual criteria and
provided dissimilar treatment for people similarly situated,4 in violation of the
Florida constitution's Declaration of Rights, 5 and the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment. The trial court ruled that the Florida statute
was discriminatory, arbitrary, and unconstitutional.6 On appeal, the Florida
supreme court reversed, terming the statute in question "a valid legislative enactment. '" The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Florida supreme
court and HELD, the tax exemption for widows was reasonably designed to
advance the Florida policy of reducing the "disparity between the economic
capabilities of a man and a woman,"" and thus not violative of the fourteenth
amendment.
The equal protection clause has provided the main constitutional protection of individual rights for almost twenty-five years. 9 Yet, until very recently,
the traditional equal protection test was used to uphold gender-based classifications.2 0 Inherent in early sex discrimination cases were presumptions re1. Fla. Stat. §196.191(7) (1969), as amended, FLA.

STAT. §196.202 (1973).
2. See FLA. STAT. §196.202 (1973); "Property to the value of five hundred dollars ($500)
of every widow, blind person, or totally and permanently disabled person who is a bona-fide
resident of this state shall be exempt from taxation." This statute exists pursuant to FLA.
CONsT. art. VII, §3(b): "There shall be exempt from taxation, cumulatively, to every head
of a family residing in this state, household goods and personal effects to the value fixed by
general law, not less than one thousand dollars, and to every widow or person who is blind
or totally and permanently disabled, property to the value fixed by general law not less
than five hundred dollars."
3. Complaint, Kahn v. Straughn, Civil No. 71-20673 (9th Cir. Fla., April 21, 1972).
4. Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, at 1-2, Kahn v. Straughn, Civil No. 71-20673 (9th Cir. Fla., April 21, 1972).
5. FLA. CONsr. art. I, §2: "All persons are equal before the law and have inalienable
rights, among which are the right to enjoy and defend life and liberty, to pursue happiness,
to be rewarded for industry, and to acquire, possess, and protect property." See also FLA.
CONsT. art. X, §5.
6. Kahn v. Straughn, Civil No. 71-20673 (9th Cir. Fla., April 21, 1972).
7. Shevin v. Kahn, 273 So. 2d 72 (Fla. 1973). The trial court permitted Florida Attorney
General, Robert Shevin, to intervene and he pursued the appeal.
8. 94 S.Ct. 1734, 1736 (1974).
9. See generally Cox, The Supreme Court 1965 Term -Foreword:
Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91 (1966); Note, Irrebutable Presumptions, 62 Gro. L.J. 173 (1974); Developments in the Law: Equal Protection,
82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1192 (1969).
10. The test assumes the validity of the legislative act and places the burden on the
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garding a woman's role in society, her familial function, her economic status,
and her political position." The basic justification offered for the validity of
sexual groupings was the judicial perception that the legislative class designated did not impermissibly deviate from the real class. 12 If the state or federal statutes captured a stereotypical sexual role, they were upheld despite
actual deviation. 1 3 The integration of equal protection analysis with sexual
presumptions, and the permissible range of deviance between the benefited or
disadvantaged class and the real class are the core concepts of gender-based
discrimination.
The majority of early sex discrimination cases applied the traditional equal
protection test, holding legislative enactments valid if the means used to implement the act were reasonably related to its object.' 4 The test questions only
"whether the classifications drawn in a statute are reasonable in light of its
purpose."' Legislative classifications "will be set aside only if no grounds can
be conceived to justify them."'16 A second equal protection test, strict scrutiny,
analyzes state action by first determining whether a fundamental interest or a
suspect classification is present. 7 If state action impinges upon either, the state
must show a compelling interest for its regulation.'B The United States Suopposing party to show that the classification is arbitrary or unreasonable. Lindsley v.
National Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78, 79 (1911).
11. Sexual presumptions are generalizations of behavior based on sexual stereotypes. They
assume that a particular trait or characteristic that is evidenced in a majority of the sexual
group is applicable to the whole group. A typical sexual presumption is that men are physically stronger than women. Such a presumption placed in a statutory classification refuses to
acknowledge individual characteristics or abilities, and binds the entire group to the majority stereotype. See generally Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
12. The discrepancy between a class as defined by the legislature and the class as it
exists in reality is often quite large. For instance, a statutory class that exempts women from
jury duty because women are more interested in domestic affairs is grossly overinclusive. The
legislative class, all women, is based on a generalization that bears no relation to a large
number of women. The courts in most instances permitted sexual classifications to exist because they believed that the legislative generalization applied to almost all of the class. Hoyt
v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961). See generally Tussman & tenBroeck, The Equal Protection of
the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341, 348-53 (1948).
13. Hoyt v. Florida, 868 U.S. 57 (1961); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948); Muller
v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
14. Lindsley v. National Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911).
15. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964).
16. McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969). This type of
minimum scrutiny test has been used only once prior to 1971, and only rarely since then, to
void statutory classifications. See James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972); Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1959).
17. See generally Note, Sex Discrimination and Equal Protection: Do We Need a Constitutional Amendment?, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1499, 1506-16 (1971).
18. An objective test to determine a fundamental interest has not yet been devised.
Rather, the decision regarding the existence of a fundamental interest seems to be premised
on two subjective judgments: "I]he relative invidiousness of the particular differentiation"
and the "relative importance of the subject with respect to which equality is sought." Cox,
supra note 9, at 95. Voting, marriage and procreation, the right to appeal a criminal conviction, and the right to travel have all been denominated fundamental interests. Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-31 (1969) (the right to travel); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of
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preme Court devised a specific suspect classification test in San Antonio School
District v. Rodriguez,19 questioning whether the persons in the challenged class
had been "subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment . ..
[or] relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process." 20 Classifications based on race, alienage, nationality, and wealth have been termed
suspect. 21 Thus, the strict scrutiny model is virtually a summary determination
22
that the classification involved is invidious and unconstitutional.
Historically, discrimination based on sex has been tested under the minimum scrutiny model. 23 In Lochner v. New York 24 the Court denied the right
of a state to limit the hours a man could work per week. Shortly thereafter,
however, the Court in Muller v. Oregon205 upheld an Oregon statute prohibiting a female from working more than ten hours a day in a laundry. The
special protection for females permitted in Muller was at that time a liberal
trend in the area of labor legislation, 26 but a consistent policy in the treatment of women. 21 The Court took notice of the prevailing attitude: "[W]oman
has always been dependent upon man .... [S]he is properly placed in a class
by herself, and legislation designed for her protection may be sustained, even
when like legislation is not necessary for men and could not be sustained." 28
The rationale for gender-based discrimination seemed to run beyond the
physiological differences inherent in a man and a woman to a presumption
regarding the "different functions in life which they perform."' 9 The Muller
decision indicated that the distinction based on sex was valid because of the
judicial perception that under minimum scrutiny the benefited class was close
enough to the real class to render any deviance harmless.2 0
Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (voting); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 356 (1963) (appeal of criminal conviction); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (procreation).
19. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
20. Id. at 28.
21. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S.
1 (1967) (race); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (wealth); Yick Wo
v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (nationality).
22. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
23. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948); Muller
v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
24. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
25. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
26. The Court was exhorted by Mr. Brandeis in his famous brief to take judicial notice
of the world legislative trend to protect women from economic exploitation by regulating
working periods and conditions. Id. at 419-20 n.2.
27. "Man is or should be woman's protector and defender. The natural and proper
timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the
The harmony, not to say identity, of interests and views which
occupations of civil life....
belong, or should belong, to the family institution, is repugnant to the idea of a woman
adopting a distinct and independent career from that of her husband .... The paramount
destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife and mother.
This is the law of the Creator." Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1873).
28. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S, 412, 421-22 (1908).
29. Id. at 423.
30. Id.
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A proliferation of legislation protecting the physiological difference and
the moral sanctity of women followed the Muller decision. 31 Courts consistently applied the minimum scrutiny test and accepted the need for and
legitimacy of such legislation. 32 In Goesaert v. Cleary33 a Michigan statute,
which precluded a female from obtaining a bartender's license unless she was
the daughter or wife of the owner of the bar, was upheld. While the statute
purported to assist in reducing female moral turpitude, it also effectively prohibited any female owning a tavern from working in her business or from
employing her daughter as a bartender. Use of the minimum scrutiny analysis
in such cases provided little recourse or protection to women who were
economically debilitated by the adverse effects of such benevolent and stereotypical statutes. Similarly, in Hoyt v. Florida4 the United States Supreme
Court upheld a Florida statute involving the differential treatment of sexes in
jury selection.3 5 That statute made male residents of Florida counties automatically available for jury duty, whereas females, who could rightfully serve
on a jury, had to notify the clerk of the county court if they desired to be
called.3 6 The Court's analysis portrayed the law as protective and "confer[ring]
an absolute exemption from jury service unless they [women] expressly waive
that privilege." 37 Neither the burden placed on women wishing to assert their
rights nor the overinclusiveness of the classification was enough to render the
statutory grouping arbitrary or unreasonable.38
A decade after Hoyt, the Supreme Court used the minimum scrutiny test to
overturn an Idaho law conferring a mandatory preference for males in the
appointment of estate administrators. In Reed v. Reed3 9 the Court ruled that
the mandatory selection of administrators based on sex alone, the singular
31. See generally Johnston & Knapp, Sex Discrimination by Law: A Study in Judicial
Perspective, 46 N.Y.U.L. Rlv. 675 (1971).
32. Eskridge v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages Control, 30 NJ. 472, 105 A.2d 6 (App.
Div. 1954); Calzadilla v. Dooley, 29 App. Div. 2d 152, 286 N.Y.S.2d 510 (4th Dep't 1968);
State v. Hunter, 208 Ore. 282, 300 P.2d 455 (1956); Heaton v. Bristol, 317 S.W.2d 86 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1958). But see Goesaert v. Cleary, 74 F. Supp. 784, 740-44 (1947) (dissenting
opinion).
33. 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
34. 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
35. But see Healy v. Edwards, 363 F. Supp. 1110, 1113-14 (E.D. La. 1973); White v.
Crook, 251 F. Supp. 401 (M.D. Ala. 1966).
36. Fla. Laws 1893, ch. 4122, §1, as amended, FLA. STAT. §40.01(1) (1973).
37. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 60 (1961).
38. That which was a privilege was also a special burden on the woman who desired to
participate in the criminal justice process. The Court explained the exemption by noting

that "a woman is still regarded as the center of home and family life," and because of her
"special responsibilities" she should be called for jury duty only upon her expressed desire
to serve. Although the Court acknowledged that it was not certain whether the procedure
employed was an outgrowth of "historic policy" or "administrative feasibility," it was convinced that the statute was based on a reasonable classification. Even a statistical illustration
that in 1957 only 220 women out of 46,000 female registered voters had applied to serve on
juries and only 10 had been called, was not of constitutional significance to the Court.
Neither was this survey substantial evidence that Florida had arbitrarily undertaken to exclude women from jury service. 1d. at 60-67,
39. 404 US. 71 (1971).
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justification being judicial efficiency, was the "very kind of arbitrary legislative
choice forbidden by the equal protection clause."40 The unanimous opinion
reiterated the constitutional mandate that persons similarly situated with respect to a legislative object must be similarly treated to be consistent with
equal protection. Although the Court struck down the statute, its use of the
minimum scrutiny test indicated that there was no fundamental change in the
attitude of the Court concerning gender-based classifications. 4 1 The opinion,
however, acknowledged a new sensitivity to the treatment of individuals based
on sex and implied that gender-based presumptions would be examined more
closely. Thus, the door remained open for the validity of sexual classifications
if reasonably related to a valid state interest.42
In Frontierov. Richardson4 3 the Court once again failed to authoritatively
delineate the legal parameters of sexual equality. 44 Frontiero concerned a fed-

eral statute that permitted a serviceman to claim his spouse as a dependent
without an actual showing of her dependence, but forced a servicewoman
claiming dependence of her spouse to prove that he in fact relied on her for
over one-half of his support. The plurality opinion found that because sex,
like race and national origin, was an "immutable characteristic determined
solely by accident of birth" and was rarely related to "ability to perform in
society," the strict scrutiny analysis was applicable. 4 , The opinion indicated
that the stricter model of analysis was essential to protect the class from being
relegated to an "inferior legal status without regard to the actual capabilities
of its individual members. " 46 Analysis by the more rigid standard demanded
that sexual presumptions be fully scrutinized and meant that no range of
deviance between the real class and the designated class would be acceptable
47
without a showing of compelling state interest.
In the principal case the constitutional question regarding the status of
sexual equality was further obfuscated by a return to the minimum scrutiny
analysis.48 The purpose of Florida Statute section 196.191(7) was to reduce the
40.
41.

Id. at 76.
Note, The Reed Case: The Seed for Equal Protection from Sex-Based Discrimination
or PoliteJudicial Hedging?, 5 AiKRON L. Rav. 251, 252-59 (1972).

42. Id. at 257.
43. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
44. Getman, The Emerging Constitutional Principle of Sexual Equality, Sup. CT. REV.
157, 166 (1972).

45. 411 U.S. at 686.
46. Id. at 687.
47. Even though eight members of the Court concurred in the ruling, the lack of
unanimity in the Court opinion holding sex to be a suspect class, reduced the precedential
value of the case to at best an unarticulated frontier of the law. Id. at 692.
48. In the period between the Reed decision and the principal case, lower federal and
state courts have displayed a marked lack of uniformity regarding a standard of analysis to
be applied in sex discrimination cases. Some courts have applied the minimum scrutiny test.
Schattman v. Texas Employment Co., 459 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1972); Bricka v. Illinois High
School Ass'n, 351 F. Supp. 69 (N.D. I1. 1972). Other courts applied a middle-range test.
Eslinger v. Thomas, 476 F.2d 225 (4th Cir. 1973); Green v. Waterford Bd. of Educ., 473
F.2d 629, 633 (2d Cir. 1973). Finally, some courts have applied the strict scrutiny test. Stem
v. Massachusetts Indem. & Life Ins. Co., 365 F. Supp. 433 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Sail'r Inn v.
Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 52, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971).
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diparity between the economic capabilities of a man and a woman by "cushioning the financial impact of spousal loss upon the sex for whom that loss imposes a disproportionately heavy burden." 49 The Court showed statistically that
women earn less than men, that they are more often discriminated against in
employment opportunities, and that their median income relative to that of
males has declined in the last seventeen years.5 0 Using the minimum scrutiny
test, the Court found that the different treatment of widows and widowers
"rests upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation
to the object of the legislation."5 1 The statistical data presented, the benevolent nature of the statute, and the lack of stigma attached to males were all
considered valid justifications for assuming that a rational relation existed to
uphold the statute.
The Court in earlier cases exhibited a definite proclivity toward upholding
state statutes that preserved sexual presumptions and protected the female
from economic exploitation and moral corruption. 52 The principal case fits
neatly into that type of legislative and judicial mold. The Court presumed
female economic inferiority, although 3.2 million females earn more money
than their husbands. 3 It affirmed the policy of protective legislation based on
a sexual stereotype and permitted a legislatively drawn class to stand though
it was grossly overinclusive. Yet the Court, in Reed and Frontiero, had begun
to outline the adverse implications of laws based on sexual presumptions
similar to the one in the instant case, which were not narrowly drawn. Retreating from the two previous sex discrimination cases, which stated that
gender-based classifications were suspect and subject to strict scrutiny, the
principal case approved a return to the minimum scrutiny analysis and a tacit
acceptance of sexual classifications if rationally related to a valid state in54
terest.
The minimum scrutiny test applied in the principal case is consistent with
the analysis used in other taxation cases. The standard of reasonableness
necessary to withstand constitutional scrutiny in the taxation area is perhaps
less than that in other areas. 55 The Court in Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto
49. Kahn v. Shevin, 94 S. Ct. 1734, 1737 (1974).
50. The Court failed to recognize that in recent years women have made the largest increase in the civilian labor force. In fact, they have accounted for two-thirds of the increase
in total employment in the 1960's, and in April 1971 approximately 32 million women were

members of the American labor force. Brief for Appellant at 6-8, 94 S.Ct. 1734 (1974).
51. 94 S. Ct. at 1737, quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).

52. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948); Muller
v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1873).

53. Brief for Appellant at 7, 94 S. Ct. 1734 (1974).
54. The instant court did seek to distinguish Frontiero, arguing females in that case

were denied "substantive and procedural benefits solely for administrative efficiency." 94 S. Ct.
at 1739.
55. In the area of taxation and economic regulations courts have opposed overturning
legislation found to be reasonable. Compare Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410
U.S. 356 (1973), with Moritz v. Commissioner, 469 F.2d 466, 470 (10th Cir. 1972). Legislative

classes in social security benefits are also subject to a lesser standard of scrutiny. Gruenwald
v. Gardener, 390 F.2d 591 (2d Cir. 1968).
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Partsstated that "where taxation is concerned and no specific right, apart
from equal protection, is imperiled, the States have large leeway in making
classifications and drawing lines which in their judgment produce a reasonable
system of taxation." 57 Only where a classification used is "palpably arbitrary"
58
or "invidious" will the Court invalidate a statute concerned with taxation.
Because of this traditional approach to equal protection arguments in tax
cases, the holding of the instant Court may be limited to gender-based classifications in the realm of taxation.
Even if the principal case is limited to sexual discrimination in the taxation
field, however, it adds only confusion and further impediments to a unitary
concept of sexual equality. Application of the suspect class test as devised in
Rodriguez would seem to place sex in the suspect classification permanently.-5
The Court in the principal case implicitly accepted that individuals, because
of their sex, have been subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment,
the primary test of a suspect class.6° With this in mind, the validity of the
minimum scrutiny test as a constitutional model for analyzing gender-based
discrimination cases must be questioned. An analysis that permits an act to
withstand constitutional review by a showing of any reasonably conceived facts
with a diminished standard of reasonableness, is in reality no analysis at all. A
model that permits overinclusive statutes to stigmatize and stereotype either
men or women into societal roles without at least an affirmative statement of
their equality, does not achieve the egalitarian goal of equal protection. 61
Application of the strict scrutiny test in instances similar to the principal
case would be an alternative with positive functional capabilities. The test
would force the state to show a compelling interest for classifications based on
gender, but hopefully would not be the edict of unconstitutionality it has
been in the past. 62 Rather, the model should place the burden on the state to

56. 410 U.S. 356 (1973). See Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 (1959).
57. 410 U.S. at 359.
58. Id. at 360.
59. 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
60. The first test of a suspect classification is whether the class has been subjected to a
"history of purposeful unequal treatment." The instant Court accepted the need to compensate women precisely because of a history of unequal treatment. The statutory purpose
was to ameliorate the economic disparity between a man and a woman caused by sexual
discrimination. Id.
61. The situation in the principal case, because of its atypical nature (a male challenging a compensatory program for females), makes comprehension of the negative ramifications
of the minimum scrutiny test difficult. Here, a benevolent statute was upheld, but the same
minimum scrutiny analysis could also be used to uphold a law inflicting severe penalties
based on sex alone. In fact a recent Colorado district court decision denied females entrance
to the United States Air Force and Naval Academies by using the minimum scrutiny test
and citing the principal case as authority. Edwards v. Schlesinger, 43 U.S.L.W. 2009 (U.S.
June 19, 1974).
62. As Professor Getman has stated: "[I]n certain circumstances achieving equality requires
specific awareness of sex." Getman, The Emerging ConstitutionalPrinciple of Sexual Equality,
Sup. CT. REV. 157, 180 (1972). The dissent in the principal case agreed and posited that
perhaps the need for compensatory assistance to women would satisfy the compelling state
interest standard. The author, however, goes on to point out the necessity of the use of a
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